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Abstract 
High replacement rates from public old age insurance might lead to the belief that little room 
is left for private sector annuities in Germany. Taking a closer look, we find a small market 
with a surprisingly large variety of products. Due to the recent pension reform and future 
ones to come the market is projected to grow substantially in the upcoming years. This paper 
describes the available annuity contracts and determines their money’s worth for different 
subgroups of the population.  
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1. Introduction 
Annuities generate a life- long income stream in return for a premium paid to an insurance 
company. In their simplest form they provide protection against the risk of outliving one’s 
resources by pooling the assets of persons with similar life expectancies when longevity is 
uncertain. They are viewed as the most important decumulation device in private defined 
contribution schemes. In Germany, tax relief for third pillar savings introduced by the 2001 
pension reform is only granted if a specified fraction is annuitized no later than at the age 
of 85. 
Markets for annuities all over the world are smaller than predictions from economic theory 
suggest.1 The literature proposes several explanations for this phenomenon. Wherever 
applicable, crowding out due to public defined benefit systems is probably the most important 
reason. In a sense, payments from these schemes can be viewed as annuities. Other 
possibilities include adverse selection if consumers are better informed about their survival 
probabilities than insurers; loss of liquidity; unwillingness to surrender one’s capital to an 
insurance company due to psychological reasons or stemming from a bequest motive; and 
administrative loads or possible mark-ups from providers.2 Some of these may lead to the 
assertion that annuities include high load factors from the perspective of the consumer. A load 
factor is any difference between the premium charged by an insurer and the premium that 
would have to be paid for a hypothetical actuarial fair annuity. In our later discussion, we 
define it to be one minus the money’s worth Ratio. 
The most popular approach to estimate these load factors has been pioneered by 
Warshawsky (1998). He defines the Money’s worth ratio (MWR) as the expected discounted 
present value of all future payments from the annuity contract, divided by the premium 
payment and calculates its values for the US market. The difference between the MWR and 
one is the proportional loading charge as perceived by the consumer. Mitchell et al. (1999) 
refine this concept and use more recent data for the US. They also extend the analysis into 
several directions, for example they incorporate taxes and calculate the insurance value of 
annuities for a class of CRRA utility functions. James and Vittas (2001) apply the money’s 
worth methodology to several countries and discuss policy implications which emerge from 
international experiences. Mitchell and McCarthy (2002) review this literature in the light of 
                                                 
1 See Mitchell and McCarthy (2002) for an overview. 
2 See for example James and Vittas (2001) 
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world-wide demographic change and supply discussions of various annuities-related topics, 
such as differential mortality and regulatory issues.  
To our knowledge, such an analysis has not yet been carried out for Germany. Public old age 
benefits have traditionally been very high, but they are projected to decline and the need for 
private provision of old age security will rise. This paper addresses the question of whether 
the German annuities market is prepared to provide reasonable substitutes for public 
payments in terms of product types and load factors. Our findings are encouraging. Despite its 
small size, a wide variety of annuity products exists. The MWR ranges between 0.65 and 1.1 
depending on the assumptions one is ready to make. Our preferred assumptions yield an 
approximate value of 0.95, which fits in well with international comparisons. Furthermore, 
specifically elaborated mortality tables are an important prerequisite for the functioning of 
annuities markets. These exist for Germany but they will need to be improved in the future. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two tries to sketch the current size of the German 
annuities market and describes the expectations regarding its future development. Section 
three characterizes the products available in the market and points out the ones which are 
analyzed later on. Section four contains a description of the mortality tables commonly used 
by insurance companies. In the fifth section we determine the money’s worth of commonly 
available annuities and present some comparative statics as well as a comparison with 
international findings. Conclusions are drawn in the last section. 
2. Market Overview 
This section tries to outline the size of the German annuities market. Data are scarce due to its 
relatively small size compared to other insurance markets. We use publications from the 
Association of German Insurance Companies (Gesamtverband der deutschen 
Versicherungswirtschaft, GDV), which comprise virtually all commercial insurers in the 
period from 1998 to 2001. The data are aggregated at a level which includes some minor 
figures that do not fit in well with our definition of annuities, for example invalidity insurance 
and long term care insurance. The figures shown thus are higher than true values but they 
should be reasonably close to them. 
Table 1 shows the payouts from annuities as compared to payments made from the public old 
age insurance system, which are the major source of income during retirement in Germany. 
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Their importance is still small, rising from a level of 1% in 1998 to 1.5% in 2001. Total 
payouts ranged at 2,735 Mio Euro in 2001, this is a rise of about 58% in a three year period. 
Future increases are projected to be even higher. First, reductions of public pension payments 
are likely to generate a new demand for private pension plans. Second, the 2001 pension 
reform has created tax incentives to invest in private pension plans which include mandatory 
annuitization no later than at the age of 85.3 
Unfortunately, no figures on the accumulation side of private old age provision by means of 
annuity contracts are available. The reason for this is the aggregation level of the data: most 
products of German life insurers serve different purposes and we are not able to isolate the 
ones of interest to us. Consider for example an endowment policy which facilitates both 
annuitization and lump sum withdrawal of the accumulated stock. In order to analyze these 
figures we would need the share of policies being annuitized which is not available. 
3. Product Overview 
Despite its relatively small size a wide variety of contracts is offered in the German annuities 
market. Sections 3 and 5 draw upon the data base “LV-Win“ from Morgen & Morgen GmbH, 
Hofheim am Taunus. It is a standard product used by brokers to make offers to their clientele. 
Thus insurance companies have a strong interest in the correct representation of their products 
and fees. The sample contains 80 companies and covers about 95% of the market. It does not 
include any group insurance (“Kollektivversicherungen”), e.g. through employer-sponsored 
pension plans.  
For the contracts under consideration, we are not able to link offers with sales. This would be 
most interesting because we find large differences in both product design and prices, which 
might be inconsistent with rational informed consumer behavior. Exploring their actual 
purchasing patterns could provide some important insights. However, the data are sufficient to 
evaluate the money’s worth of individual annuities. Extending the typology of Poterba (1997), 
we first organize the products along the following lines. 
Method of paying premiums: The two predominant forms in this category are fixed annual 
and single premiums (“Rentenversicherung gegen laufende Beiträge” / “RV gegen 
Einmalzahlung”). We do not have information on the availability of more flexible 
                                                 
3 Quoted from Schnabel (2002), where a detailed analysis of future prospects of the German annuities market 
can be found. 
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contribution schemes. Our focus in the analysis below is on single premium annuities, the 
motivation will be given in the next paragraph. 
Waiting period: Contracts with zero and positive waiting periods should be distinguished in 
an analysis. Nonetheless our focus on single premium immediate annuities (SPIAs, 
“sofortbeginnende RV gegen Einmalzahlung”) is quite general because most deferred 
annuities (“aufgeschobene RV”) contain a refund option during accumulation. 4 In this case, a 
person approaching retirement age faces exactly the same choice regarding annuitization as 
someone who accumulated stock in a different investment object. Consequently, such a 
contract can be divided into two different components, the first one being an accumulation 
vehicle, the second one being a SPIA. For our purposes only the latter part is of interest. 
Number of lives insured: An individual life annuity pays benefits to the recipient until the 
time of death. In case of a joint annuity, payments continue as long as any of the insured 
persons is alive. With very few exceptions only individual contracts are offered on the 
German market. However, depending on the above contract characteristics some 65-78% of 
the companies offer supplementary survivorship insurance (“Hinterbliebenenzusatz-
versicherung”) which has the same implications as a joint annuity. We only consider 
individual contracts as neither data on prices for survivor policies nor joint mortality tables 
are available. 
Nature of payouts: We consider period certain annuities (“RV mit Garantiezeit”) and life 
annuities without refund (“RV ohne Beitragsrückgewähr”). In the first case benefits are paid 
during a fixed number of years regardless of the death of the annuitant. If he dies, the 
payment is made to his beneficiaries. Period certain annuities are more popular than regular 
ones. The longest possible guaranteed payment period depends on the entry age, with no 
guaranteed payment possible beyond the age of 80. We include periods of 0, 5, 10, 15, and 20 
years, although we report only results on the 0 and the 10 year period certain contracts. 
Roughly a third of the companies offer contracts with a refund option during the 
decumulation phase. We do not consider these products for clarity reasons. 
Allocation of investment and inflation risk: Three combinations are possible in this case. Real 
annuities assign both risks to the insurer. He bears the investment risk only if the annuity is 
                                                 
4 This is true for 96% of the contracts offered on the market with fixed annual premiums and 86% of single 
premium deferred annuities. 
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paid on a nominal basis and none of the two if a variable annuity is considered.5 We could not 
detect any real annuities offered on the German market. There exists a small but growing 
market of pure variable annuities (“fondsgebundene RV”). Their money’s worth will depend 
in large parts on the future returns on the underlying investment vehicle.6 Although we will 
face a similar problem when evaluating standard German annuity contracts, it is less 
important there. We do not consider variable annuities in our analysis. 
The standard product in Germany is a participating annuity. It contains a nominal guaranteed 
annuity and a variable part which depends on the surplus of the company. 7 Law restricts the 
maximum interest rate insurers can use to calculate the guaranteed part of the annuity to 
3.25%. It further requires firms to apply mortality tables and costs valid on the date when the 
contract was signed. The nominal guaranteed annuity is calculated on this basis. Capital gains 
or losses on the annuitants’ assets relative to this rate as well as deviations of realized from 
expected mortality and administrative costs enter the surplus of the company. If positive, at 
least 90% of the capital gains have to be paid out to the insured within 5 years according to 
tax law.8 On the basis of their surplus, companies calculate the profit sharing rate 
(“Überschussbeteiligung”). Subtracting the guaranteed rate of generally 3.25% and 
multiplying this by the initial premium payment yields the variable, or participating, 
component of the annuity. 
Type of participation: The two polar forms of participation are constant and escalating 
schemes (“Konstante Rente” and “Dynamische Rente”). Most companies also offer mixed 
forms (“Teildynamische Rente”). If participation of the constant type is chosen, each year an 
amount depending on the premium payment and the profit sharing rate is added to the 
guaranteed part. If this rate does not change over time, the annuity will be constant, however 
it can either rise or fall over time. With the escalating annuity option the participation 
component is annuitized, yielding a yearly rise of the guaranteed pension payment. This 
annual growth rate (“Dynamisierungsfaktor”) equals approximately the profit sharing rate less 
the guaranteed interest rate of usually 3.25%.  
Throughout the last 25 years variations of the profit sharing rate have been very low 
compared to capital market fluctuations: German insurance companies follow a strategy of 
                                                 
5 One might argue that a variable annuity provides a hedge against inflation. In our case the validity of the 
Fisher effect is not required, as we do not include inflation in the analysis.  
6 For a description of the mechanics of variable annuities, see Poterba (1997). 
7 The following description of the German participation scheme is a gross simplification. For details on the 
system, see for example Schierenbeck and Hölscher (1998). 
8 See Schierenbeck and Hölscher (1998), p. 734. 
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smoothing surplus over time. Tax law facilitates this by allowing hidden reserves in the 
balance sheet. Additionally, high periodic surpluses can be used to build up reserves which 
have to be distributed in the course of up to five years. Albrecht and Maurer (2002) consider 
the net investment returns of insurers on a book value basis. Since this is the predominant and 
most volatile position in the surplus (minor ones being gains or losses from actual over 
expected mortality and costs) this is a reasonable proxy for profit sharing rates. Average net 
investment returns ranged between 6.85% and 7.5% during the period from 1980 to 1998 for 
the thirty largest insurers.9 More recently, profit sharing rates already declined slightly to a 
2002 average of 6.17%. In 2003 they experienced another drop to currently 4.8%10 which 
represents an all time low. These figures contain the guaranteed interest rate of 3.25%. 
4. Mortality tables 
This section illustrates some rather technical details regarding the mortality tables available in 
Germany. It contains additional information which is not essential for understanding the 
money’s worth concept in the succeeding section and might be skipped. We follow the 
calculation of tables provided by the German Actuaries’ Society (Deutsche 
Aktuarvereinigung, DAV), labeled DAV 1994 R. To our knowledge these provide the 
calculation base for most insurance companies when dealing with annuities. Some large 
insurers are known to construct their own tables while small companies lack the sufficient 
database to do so. In the following we try to outline the method of construction as done in 
Schmithals and Schütz (1995). The last part of this section compares the different tables and 
comments on their validity for our purposes.  
Schmithals and Schütz (1995) consider four basic steps to construct the annuitant mortality 
tables which we use for estimating the money’s worth ratios of annuities: first, a trend 
function is estimated which approximates future mortality changes. In a next step, period 
tables are constructed for each year. Cohort mortality can be derived directly from these 
tables.11 Fourth, mortality differences between the general population and insured persons are 
calculated, yielding two different tables. In order to reflect actuarial conservativeness, the 
final DAV 1994R tables contain an arbitrary further reduction of mortality in a fifth step. This 
one is irrelevant for us because it has nothing to do with actual mortality. 
                                                 
9 Albrecht and Maurer (2002). 
10 Average profit sharing rates refer to all firms in the market and were provided by Morgen & Morgen GmbH. 
11 For a nice introduction on this matter, see McCarthy and Mitchell (2002) 
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Estimation of the trend function: For this purpose, census data from 1870 to 1987 are used to 
obtain a log- linear regression function. In the recent past sharper declines in old age mortality 
than before are detected. In order to take this into account, a multiplicative bonus in old age 
mortality improvements is incorporated into the trend function. This results in a constant 
mortality decline over time for each age group. Trend functions differ by sex but are assumed 
to be identical for annuitants and members of the general population. 
Construction of period tables: Using the trend function, a period table obtained from census 
data is projected into each future year under consideration. Additionally, a smoothing 
algorithm is applied and the tables are extrapolated to cover mortality until age 110 because 
census tables end at age 89. 
Construction of cohort tables: In order to obtain cohort mortality, a generation is “followed” 
through the period tables. The resulting tables are often referred to as two-dimensional tables. 
Mortality tables for the insured population: With data from six life insurance companies 
ranging from 1967 to 1992 the relative mortality of insured persons to the general population 
is calculated, depending on sex and age. Consistent with adverse selection a lower mortality 
of annuitants is detected.  
Comparison of the different tables: McCarthy and Mitchell (2000) provide some metrics for 
comparing mortality tables, out of which we only report small parts. Figure 1 shows annual 
probabilities of death, conditional on reaching the respective year of life. It clearly reveals 
higher mortality for men relative to women. Of course, rates for the insured population are 
lower than for the general population. Table 2 shows the expected remaining lifetime at 
age 65. The calculations from period tables can be interpreted as the expected remaining 
lifetime of a contemporary 65-year-old if there were no mortality improvement for his cohort 
in the future. The difference between two row entries thus yields the effect of the trend 
function for his cohort. Differences between column entries show the effect of switching from 
the general to the insured population.  
Comment on the tables: A few critical notes seem necessary regarding these mortality tables. 
First, one can always dispute the validity of past time trends for predicting future mortality 
improvements. Another approach would be to model expected medical change and simulate 
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its impact on expected future mortality. 12 We stick with the standard approach of the DAV 
because it seems reasonable in an international perspective.13 The way mortality differences 
between the general population and annuitants are constructed does not make sense for our 
purposes. This issue arises because the sample size of insured persons is very small, having a 
minimum for females aged 60 to 65 with about 20 observed deaths. The resulting relative 
mortality of insured women aged 60 is 110% compared to 47% at the age of 62. Clearly, this 
does not make sense. Schmithals and Schütz (1995) help themselves by assuming the relative 
mortality of this group to be 40% lower for insured persons relative to the general population. 
While being sufficiently conservative in order to calculate premiums, this approach does not 
consistently estimate the relative mortality of insured persons. Lacking better data we use 
these tables anyways. Collecting adequate data on annuitant mortality will be necessary. 
Therefore, our results for the annuitant population thus should be seen as an orientation only 
regarding the magnitude of the selection effects. A more serious problem stems from the lack 
of data on mortality beyond age 89. As explained above, the 2001 pension reform 
incorporates the possibility of programmed withdrawals and deferred annuitization at the age 
of 85. Current data clearly are not sufficient for calculating fairly priced annuities in this 
group. 
5. The Money’s Worth of Individual Annuities 
In this section we apply the methodology developed by Mitchell et al. (1999) to determine the 
load factors in the German market, looking at single premium immediate annuities as 
described in section three. To get an idea of the magnitude of the monthly payouts, we first 
present their averages, maxima, and minima per € 1,000 premium in tables 3 and 4.14 
Reported results are from samples of 17 to 61 firms, because not every firm offers the whole 
range of contract specifications.15 Consistent with international findings,16 we discover 
considerable price heterogeneity among firms. Correlations between profit sharing rates and 
guaranteed payouts are positive in a range from 0.25 to 0.3. This means that on average there 
is no trade-off between the two, which might have been a reason for payout heterogeneity, if 
risk aversion varies across consumers. If there had been a trade-off, a highly risk averse 
                                                 
12 For example, GE Frankona Re bases its reinsurance products for annuities on an approach like this. See GE 
Frankona Re (2000). 
13 See McCarthy and Mitchell (2000). 
14 All our calculations are based on an initial premium of € 100,000. Contrary to our expectations based on 
administration loads, increasing this value produces a slight decrease in the payout ratio and vice versa. 
15 For our purposes sample size does not matter since we are only interested in the availability of products. 
16 See Mitchell and McCarthy (2002) for the US, James and Vittas (2001) for the UK, Australia, and Canada. 
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consumer might have chosen a contract with high guaranteed payments and less important 
participating components, the opposite being true for consumers with lower risk aversion. 
Examining the link between annuity payouts and the rating of providers, we also detect some 
positive correlation. Thus, there is no risk premium implicit in the contracts but pricing seems 
to depend on factors unobservable for us. 
Due to differential mortality, average payouts increase with the entry age and payouts for men 
are considerably higher than for women at each age. Surplus payouts are almost equal across 
age and sex groups on an individual contract level, suggesting that they only depend on the 
initial premium. Thus the variable part of the annuity is more important for women than for 
men as they face a lower guaranteed payout. This is also true for younger persons compared 
to older ones. Findings on period certain annuities are not surprising either. We only report 
values for the 10-year period, which yields lower payouts than a contract without such an 
attribute. The difference in payouts between regular and period certain annuities increases 
with the entry age because of increasing mortality. 
The Money’s Worth Methodology: To illustrate loading charges we calculate the Money’s 
worth ratio (MWR) which is defined as the expected discounted value of future payouts from 
the insurance company per Euro of premium. All monthly benefit payments are multiplied by 
the probability of reaching the corresponding month of life (i.e. the probability of receiving 
this payment), discounted, summed up and divided by the initial premium: 
( )å= +
×
×=
T
1t
ti1
tAtp
emiumPr
1
MWR
t
 
At this point three parameters are to be determined: the interest rate for a t-month investment 
it, the survival probability up to period t pt, and monthly payouts At. Regarding the mortality 
assumptions, we use the tables discussed in the preceding section17. To obtain monthly 
survival probabilities, we calculate the geometric mean of annual values. This amounts to 
assuming constant probabilities within years of life. Second, to discount future benefits, we 
use short-term Euro-money-market rates and the yields of German government bonds 
(“Staatsanleihen”) for maturities of one to thirty years. The latest maturity on the German 
treasury market is 26.8 years. After this period we update this interest rate into the future. Last 
                                                 
17 For readers who have skipped this section, there is one table for the general population and another one for 
insured persons with lower mortality rates. This is due to adverse selection: people with short remaining life 
expectancies do much less frequently buy immediate annuities. 
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and most important are the insurance payouts. We calculate MWRs for the guaranteed 
nominal annuity only and for the two polar participation schemes. The corresponding 
assumptions are described in detail in the following paragraphs, a comparative static analysis 
follows at the end of this section. Finally, we incorporate guaranteed payment periods in the 
analysis. This amounts to assuming a survival probability of one during the period of 
guaranteed payouts, afterwards the same formulas apply as in the simple case. We only report 
results for 10-year period certain annuities, as MWRs do not vary substantially across 
different periods. 
Discussion of the discount rate: A major determinant of the MWR is the discount rate which 
has to reflect an alternative investment with similar risks attached to it. In the case of pure 
nominal annuities, this risk is restricted to the insolvency risk of the annuity provider. This led 
researchers in other countries to using the corporate bond yields as discount rates.18 We 
neglect this risk because of the strong regulatory framework in Germany. There has not been 
any reported insolvency of an insurance company for decades. Even without default risk, 
German annuities bear some investment risk for the participating part. Using government 
yields will overstate the MWR if there is no risk adjustment. However, applying yields of the 
Markovitz market portfolio will overestimate the attached risk. As the product profile is 
unique, an adequate rate simply does not exist. A look at the low historical volatility of net 
investment returns on a book value basis of life insurers favors the use of government 
yields.19 This procedure is disputable and the reader not comfortable with it is referred to the 
comparative static analysis. 
Results for Germany: Consider the first column in Panel I of table 6. It contains MWRs only 
for the guaranteed nominal annuity assuming zero participation in all periods. This is clearly a 
drastic assumption, but it provides some insight because the insurer bears investment and 
mortality risk only up to this point. The first entry shows the MWR for 60-year-old males, 
assuming population mortality. Its value of 0.76 appears to be rather low, but apart from the 
interest rate, assumptions are as conservative as possible. Results for ages 60 and 70 are 
similar. Looking at the outcomes for annuitants, we find a selection effect which raises the 
MWR by 0.07 to 0.09 points. This is about the magnitude encountered in international 
                                                 
18 See Mitchell and McCarthy (2002) for a good discussion. 
19 This implies using portfolio volatility as perceived by the consumer as risk measure.  
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comparisons20. Nevertheless it should be interpreted with caution due to the problems 
associated with the corresponding mortality table.  
For the second column we use 2003 payouts of contracts with the constant participation 
scheme and simply update them into all future periods. We will return to the plausibility of 
this assumption later. Ratios rise to 0.89 and more. The increase is most pronounced for 60-
year-olds, because as noted earlier the absolute value of the participation payment only 
depends on initial premiums. This group has the highest remaining life expectancy. The 
selection effect rises proportionally compared to the first column. For annuitants the MWR 
approaches unity. 
In order to obtain MWRs for the escalating participation scheme we use the same growth 
rates of the annuities for all periods as reported in our data base for 2003 for each insurer. 
MWRs are slightly lower than for the constant participation scheme. In this case the selection 
effect becomes more pronounced because high benefits in late periods are weighted stronger 
due to lower mortality among annuitants. 
With regard to Panel II, we do not expect notable changes of the MWR for the annuitants. 
Turning the life annuity into a certain payment during ten year period should be reflected in a 
reduction of payouts which is based on annuitant mortality. Our results confirm this 
expectation. Correspondingly, MWRs for the general population rise slightly by 0.01 to 0.04 
points because setting mortality to zero during ten years results in a larger difference for this 
group. Hence, the selection effect can be attenuated by including a guaranteed payment 
period.  
Results for women are reported in Table 7. MWRs are higher in most cases, around 0.78 for 
the guaranteed annuity in the general population. The selection effect seems to be less 
important than for males, ranging form 0.05 to 0.075 in the first column. Incorporating any 
participation component produces stronger increases in the MWR than in the case of males 
which is due to lower female mortality. Again, the participation component only depends on 
the initial premium, not on sex or age. Nearly all values including participation payments 
exceed unity. Conclusions regarding period certain annuities are the same as for males. 
Comparative Statics: Our results depend heavily on the assumptions on interest and profit 
sharing rates. Up to now we assumed values given today which need not be valid in the 
                                                 
20 An overview is given in Mitchell and McCarthy (2002). 
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future. In this section we explore alternative scenarios and relate them to past experiences. We 
consider increases in either one or both rates. Similar results are obtained for corresponding 
decreases, thus we do not report them.  
Tables 8 and 9 show some results if 100 or 200 basis points are added to either the annual 
interest or the profit sharing rate, or both. Raising the interest rate by 100 basis points 
produces drops in MWR of the guaranteed part of 0.05 to 0.07 (see the first column in 
Panels II). The effect gets weaker when increasing the entry age. This last statement is also 
true for relative changes, which is nearly equal in all three columns. An increase in the 
interest rate of 100 basis points causes the money’s worth to fall by 6.3% to 8.3%. The effect 
is strongest for women aged 60 and least pronounced for 70-year-old males. It declines in the  
magnitude of the basis points added to the interest rate, see Panel V. These figures show how 
important interest rate assumptions are for the MWR. 
When varying the profit sharing rates, we only consider changes in the annuities’ growth rates 
in the escalating scheme. We did not find a reasonable way to model the impact of changes in 
profit sharing rates on benefits in the constant participation scheme. The relative changes are 
slightly larger in absolute value than in the case of the interest rate. Adding 100 basis points to 
the profit sharing rate in each period yields a rise of the MWR of 7.8% to 13.5%. The large 
range stems from mortality differences and the calculation of the participation component. As 
expected, it is highest for the group with the lowest mortality rate which are female annuitants 
aged 60. A 70-year-old man belonging to the general population profits the least from such a 
rise.21 
Increasing both rates by 100 basis points at the same time yields MWRs similar to the ones 
resulting from our original assumptions (see Panels IV). If they are increased by 200 basis 
points each, the profit sharing rate effect predominates and causes higher MWRs.  
The assumptions which lead to our original results under either the constant or the escalating 
participation scheme seem most plausible to us. The profit sharing rates we use are 
historically low and they appear sufficiently conservative even in the current capital market 
situation, although they certainly do not represent a lower bound. During the last 20 years, 
insurers have been more successful than this. Another assumption one may want to criticize is 
the interest rate level, which is also low in a historical perspective. This might yield too high 
                                                 
21 The gains would be closer together in the case of constant participation. See the above discussion of the 
selection effect in the different participation schemes. 
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MWRs. However, if they were to increase we would suspect a positive correlation of interest 
and profit sharing rates.22 In this case, either scenario IV or VI might apply and results do not 
change substantially. 
International comparisons: Our results fit in well with international findings as compiled in 
Mitchell and McCarthy (2002) from different sources. We report them in Table 10. MWRs 
based on our preferred assumptions for both annuitant and general populations are 
comparable to those estimated in the UK, Australia and Italy, while being slightly lower than 
in Canada and higher than in the US. Nevertheless, it should be noted that these values are 
estimates for guaranteed nominal annuities, while our analysis is based on participating 
annuities. This does not imply direct utility consequences if consumers are willing to bear 
some risk. After all, there is the possibility to gain more through the participation component, 
which is not present in pure guaranteed annuities. Estimates for the MWR of participating 
annuities are available for Switzerland. They are remarkably high, exceeding unity for almost 
all subgroups of the population. In our understanding of the original paper by James and 
Vittas (2001), these are based on rather optimistic assumptions on the participation 
component. Results are comparable to those reported in the third Panels of Tables 8 and 9, 
which reflect the scenario present a few years ago.  
The insurance value of annuities: We use the results from Mitchell et. al. (1999) to illustrate 
the utility value for a CRRA utility function with a unity risk aversion parameter. This reflects 
a relatively low risk aversion. They assume stochastic inflation with a mean of 3.2% and a 
preexisting real annuity amounting to 50% of total wealth at the age of 65, e.g. claims from 
public old age insurance. For different values of the interest rate and the individual time 
discount rate, they obtain critical MWR values of about 0.75. This is to be interpreted as 
follows: an individual with this utility function who already owns a real annuity will attach a 
positive utility value to an additional nominal annuity if the loading charges do not exceed 
25%. Comparing this result to tables 8 and 9, we find that he will buy an additional annuity in 
nearly all of the scenarios, even if only considering the guaranteed part of the annuity. 
                                                 
22 Bonds are the predominant capital investment of insurance companies. As future coupon payments go up 
because of rising interest rates, so should profit sharing rates.  
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6. Summary and Outlook 
Our findings thus far came as a positive surprise to us. Money’s worth ratios in Germany are 
comparable to international ones despite the small market size. Consumers can choose among 
many different contract specifications, although we are missing offers of real annuities and 
offers for people older than 70. The decline of benefits from the public old age insurance 
scheme and tax benefits for private retirement saving will lead to an increase in volume. It is 
not clear, however, what will happen to money’s worth ratios if annuities account for a 
significant part of insurance companies’ revenue in the future. They might increase because of 
fiercer competition. On the contrary, if companies have some market power, MWRs could 
decrease because annuities have to account for a larger revenue share. 
Mortality tables will need improvement in order to facilitate sensible pricing of annuities with 
an entry age of 85 years which are projected to be a popular withdrawal option for third pillar 
saving. From our perspective, a better estimation of the selection effect is desirable. 
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Table 1 
 
 1 2 3    
 
Annuities 
paid by 
insurers 
Main 
insurance 
benefits paid 
by insurers 
Payments 
from Public 
Old Age 
Insurance 
Growth Rate 
Annuities Ratio Ratio 
Year Mio Euro Mio Euro Mio Euro  1 / 2 1 / 3 
       
1998 1,732 25,841 171,512  6.7% 1.0% 
1999 2,053 29,402 167,782 18.5% 7.0% 1.2% 
2000 2,457 32,804 177,758 19.7% 7.5% 1.4% 
2001 2,735 35,429 183,393 11.3% 7.7% 1.5% 
       
Increase 1998-2001 57.9% 37.1% 6.9%    
Average annual 
Increase 
12.1% 8.2% 1.7%    
 
 
Note: Main Insurance Contracts denote life insurance contracts, private old age insurance, and some minor 
positions. They are called this way because they may include additional options such as invalidity insurance, 
which are not included in these figures. Source: GDV, Statistical Yearbooks of German Insurance 2002, 2001, 
2000. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Expected remaining lifetime       
       
  
Male 
Population 
Male 
Insured 
Female 
Population 
Female 
Insured 
          
Period table for 2003, 
beginning at age 65 16.0 18.6 19.9 22.3 
         
Cohort aged 65 in 2003 16.9 19.6 21.3 24.1 
 
 
Note: Own calculation based on tables provided in Schmithals and Schütz (1995). 
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Table 3 
 
Payouts per € 1.000 Premium – Men 
 
No Period Certain Annuity  
 
Guaranteed 
Part  
Constant 
Participation 
Scheme 
Average  4.84 5.72 
Lowest  4.72 4.73 60 
Highest 4.99 6.33 
       
Average 5.51 6.43 
Lowest 5.38 5.45 65 
Highest 5.71 7.00 
       
Average 6.68 7.59 
Lowest 6.47 6.47 70 
Highest 6.90 8.18 
 
 
10 Years Period Certain Annuity 
 
Guaranteed 
Part 
Constant 
Participation 
Scheme 
Average 4.73 5.55 
Lowest 4.50 4.64 60 
Highest 4.90 6.19 
    
Average 5.30 6.07 
Lowest 5.04 5.25 65 
Highest 5.50 6.75 
    
Average 6.17 6.96 
Lowest 5.86 6.02 70 
Highest 6.39 7.54 
 
 
Note: Annuity payouts as provided in LV-Win by Morgen & Morgen GmbH. 
Calculations are based on an initial premium of Euro 100,000 on a single  
premium immediate life annuity. 
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Table 4 
 
Payouts per € 1.000 Premium – Women 
 
No Period Certain Annuity  
 
Guaranteed 
Part  
Constant 
Participation 
Scheme 
Average  4.27 5.18 
Lowest  4.17 4.19 60 
Highest 4.42 5.75 
       
Average 4.91 5.79 
Lowest 4.74 4.74 65 
Highest 5.08 6.35 
       
Average 5.69 6.57 
Lowest 5.54 5.54 70 
Highest 5.89 7.12 
 
 
10 Years Period Certain Annuity 
 
Guaranteed 
Part 
Constant 
Participation 
Scheme 
Average 4.23 5.06 
Lowest 4.04 4.16 60 
Highest 4.39 5.70 
      
Average 4.82 5.62 
Lowest 4.59 4.67 65 
Highest 5.00 6.25 
      
Average 5.49 6.31 
Lowest 5.22 5.36 70 
Highest 5.70 6.88 
 
 
Note: Annuity payouts as provided in LV-Win by Morgen & Morgen GmbH. 
Calculations are based on an initial premium of Euro 100,000 on a single  
premium immediate life annuity. 
 - 21 - 
Table 5 
 
Term Interest Rate 
1 Month 2.65% 
3 Months 2.53% 
6 Months 2.46% 
1 year 2.41% 
2 years 2.33% 
3 years 2.49% 
5 years 3.06% 
7 years 3.61% 
10 years 4.00% 
15 years 4.36% 
20 years 4.55% 
25 years 4.75% 
30 years 4.76% 
 
Source: European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin March 2003, 
and http://www.bondboard.de/. 
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Table 6 
 
Panel I - No Guaranteed Payment Period, Men 
Age 
Mortality 
Table 
Only 
Guaranteed 
Part 
Constant 
Participation 
Scheme 
Escalating 
Participation 
Scheme *) 
         
Population 0.763 0.902 0.886 
60 
Annuitants 0.833 0.985 0.981 
         
Population 0.760 0.886 0.864 
65 
Annuitants 0.840 0.980 0.968 
         
Population 0.780 0.887 0.868 
70 
Annuitants 0.872 0.990 0.982 
 
*) Average Growth Rate: 1.55% 
 
 
Panel II - 10 Years Guaranteed Payment Period, Men 
Age 
Mortality 
Table 
Only 
Guaranteed 
Part 
Constant 
Participation 
Scheme 
Escalating 
Participation 
Scheme *) 
         
Population 0.780 0.915 0.894 
60 
Annuitants 0.835 0.980 0.971 
         
Population 0.788 0.902 0.885 
65 
Annuitants 0.846 0.969 0.963 
         
Population 0.817 0.921 0.900 
70 
Annuitants 0.876 0.988 0.976 
 
**) Average Growth Rate: 1.45% 
 
 
Note: Each entry shows the Money’s worth ratio. All calculations 
use the all-company sample average annuity payouts. Samples differ 
by type of contract, this is why average growth rates may differ, too. 
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Table 7 
 
Panel I - No Guaranteed Payment Period, Women 
Age 
Mortality 
Table 
Only 
Guaranteed 
Part 
Constant 
Participation 
Scheme 
Escalating 
Participation 
Scheme *) 
         
Population 0.776 0.942 0.922 
60 
Annuitants 0.826 1.003 0.995 
         
Population 0.795 0.938 0.921 
65 
Annuitants 0.857 1.012 1.008 
         
Population 0.795 0.918 0.900 
70 
Annuitants 0.870 1.005 0.999 
 
*) Average Growth Rate: 1.55% 
 
 
Panel II - 10 Years Guaranteed Payment Period, Women 
Age 
Mortality 
Table 
Only 
Guaranteed 
Part 
Constant 
Participation 
Scheme 
Escalating 
Participation 
Scheme *) 
         
Population 0.782 0.935 0.917 
60 
Annuitants 0.827 0.988 0.982 
         
Population 0.805 0.940 0.923 
65 
Annuitants 0.858 1.001 0.997 
         
Population 0.814 0.936 0.912 
70 
Annuitants 0.873 1.004 0.992 
 
**) Average Growth Rate: 1.45% 
 
 
Note: Each entry shows the Money’s worth ratio. All calculations 
use the all-company sample average annuity payouts. Samples differ 
by type of contract, this is why average growth rates may differ, too. 
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Table 8 
 
Comparative Statics - Men, No Guaranteed Payment Period 
 
Panel I     Panel II    
     
     Age 
  
Only 
Guaranteed 
Part 
Constant 
Participation 
Scheme 
Escalating 
Participation 
Scheme 
 
Age 
  
Only 
Guaranteed 
Part 
Constant 
Participation 
Scheme 
Escalating 
Participation 
Scheme 
                   
Population  0.763 0.902 0.886  Population  0.705 0.834 0.815 60 
Annuitants 0.833 0.985 0.981  
60 
Annuitants 0.769 0.909 0.901 
                   
Population  0.760 0.886 0.864  Population  0.706 0.823 0.798 65 
Annuitants 0.840 0.980 0.968  
65 
Annuitants 0.778 0.907 0.891 
                   
Population  0.780 0.887 0.868  Population  0.731 0.830 0.809 
70 
Annuitants 0.872 0.990 0.982  
70 
Annuitants 0.812 0.923 0.911 
 Basis points added to interest rate: 0   Basis points added to interest rate: 100 
 Basis points added to profit sharing rates: 0   Basis points added to profit sharing rates: 0 
           
Panel III     Panel IV    
     
     Age 
  
Only 
Guaranteed 
Part 
Constant 
Participation 
Scheme 
Escalating 
Participation 
Scheme 
 
Age 
  
Only 
Guaranteed 
Part 
Constant 
Participation 
Scheme 
Escalating 
Participation 
Scheme 
                   
Population  - - 0.980  Population  - - 0.899 60 
Annuitants - - 1.096  
60 
Annuitants - - 1.005 
                   
Population  - - 0.941  Population  - - 0.867 65 
Annuitants - - 1.064  
65 
Annuitants - - 0.977 
                   
Population - - 0.931  Population  - - 0.866 
70 
Annuitants - - 1.063  
70 
Annuitants - - 0.983 
 Basis points added to interest rate: 0   Basis points added to interest rate: 100 
 Basis points added to profit sharing rates: 100   Basis points added to profit sharing rates: 100 
           
Panel V     Panel VI    
     
     Age 
  
Only 
Guaranteed 
Part 
Constant 
Participation 
Scheme 
Escalating 
Participation 
Scheme 
 
Age 
  
Only 
Guaranteed 
Part 
Constant 
Participation 
Scheme 
Escalating 
Participation 
Scheme 
                   
Population  0.654 0.774 0.753  Population  - - 0.917 60 
Annuitants 0.712 0.842 0.832  
60 
Annuitants - - 1.037 
                   
Population  0.658 0.768 0.741  Population  - - 0.872 65 
Annuitants 0.723 0.843 0.825  
65 
Annuitants - - 0.991 
                   
Population  0.687 0.780 0.758  Population  - - 0.865 
70 
Annuitants 0.760 0.863 0.848  
70 
Annuitants - - 0.986 
 Basis points added to interest rate: 200   Basis points added to interest rate: 200 
 Basis points added to profit sharing rates: 0   Basis points added to profit sharing rates: 200 
 
Note: Each entry shows the Money’s worth ratio using the same samples as before. Either a parallel shift is 
applied to the interest rate for each period and / or the profit sharing rate is increased in the same fashion. 
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Table 9 
 
Comparative Statics - Women, No Guaranteed Payment Period 
 
Panel I     Panel II    
     
     Age 
  
Only 
Guaranteed 
Part 
Constant 
Participation 
Scheme 
Escalating 
Participation 
Scheme 
 
Age 
  
Only 
Guaranteed 
Part 
Constant 
Participation 
Scheme 
Escalating 
Participation 
Scheme 
                   
Population  0.776 0.942 0.922  Population  0.715 0.868 0.846 60 
Annuitants 0.826 1.003 0.995  
60 
Annuitants 0.761 0.924 0.914 
                   
Population 0.795 0.938 0.921  Population  0.733 0.866 0.846 65 
Annuitants 0.857 1.012 1.008  
65 
Annuitants 0.790 0.933 0.925 
                   
Population  0.795 0.918 0.900  Population  0.738 0.853 0.832 
70 
Annuitants 0.870 1.005 0.999  
70 
Annuitants 0.805 0.930 0.920 
 Basis points added to interest rate: 0   Basis points added to interest rate: 100 
 Basis points added to profit sharing rates: 0   Basis points added to profit sharing rates: 0 
           
Panel III     Panel IV    
     
     Age 
  
Only 
Guaranteed 
Part 
Constant 
Participation 
Scheme 
Escalating 
Participation 
Scheme 
 
Age 
  
Only 
Guaranteed 
Part 
Constant 
Participation 
Scheme 
Escalating 
Participation 
Scheme 
                   
Population  - - 1.036  Population  - - 0.948 60 
Annuitants - - 1.130  
60 
Annuitants - - 1.036 
                   
Population  - - 1.018  Population  - - 0.932 65 
Annuitants - - 1.125  
65 
Annuitants - - 1.030 
                   
Population  - - 0.978  Population  - - 0.901 
70 
Annuitants - - 1.096  
70 
Annuitants - - 1.006 
 Basis points added to interest rate: 0   Basis points added to interest rate: 100 
 Basis points added to profit sharing rates: 100   Basis points added to profit sharing rates: 100 
           
Panel V     Panel VI    
     
     Age 
  
Only 
Guaranteed 
Part 
Constant 
Participation 
Scheme 
Escalating 
Participation 
Scheme 
 
Age 
  
Only 
Guaranteed 
Part 
Constant 
Participation 
Scheme 
Escalating 
Participation 
Scheme 
                   
Population  0.662 0.803 0.780  Populati on - - 0.984 60 
Annuitants 0.705 0.855 0.844  
60 
Annuitants - - 1.093 
                   
Population  0.679 0.803 0.780  Population  - - 0.946 65 
Annuitants 0.731 0.864 0.853  
65 
Annuitants - - 1.060 
                   
Population  0.688 0.795 0.772  Population  - - 0.903 
70 
Annuitants 0.748 0.864 0.851  
70 
Annuitants - - 1.017 
 Basis points added to interest rate: 200   Basis points added to interest rate: 200 
 Basis points added to profit sharing rates: 0   Basis points added to profit sharing rates: 200 
 
Note: Each entry shows the Money’s worth ratio using the same samples as before. Either a parallel shift is 
applied to the interest rate for each period and / or the profit sharing rate is increased in the same fashion. 
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Table 10 
 
 
International MWRs - 65-year-old Men 
  Germany UK Australia Canada Switzerland US Italy 
Population 0.887 0.897 0.914 0.925 0.965 0.814 
not 
available 
Annuitants 0.980 0.966 0.986 1.014 1.169 0.927 0.958 
 
 
International MWRs - 65-year-old Women 
  Germany UK Australia Canada Switzerland US Italy 
Population 0.939 0.910 0.910 0.937 1.029 0.852 
not 
available 
Annuitants 1.013 0.957 0.970 1.015 1.152 0.927 0.965 
 
 
Note: Results for Germany are taken from our own calculations. MWRs for other countries stem from the 
compilation given in Mitchell and McCarthy (2002) and from James and Vittas (2001) 
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Figure 1 
 Conditional Mortality Rates - Period Table 2000
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Note: The conditional mortality rate is the probability of dying at age t+1 conditional on reaching age t. Based on 
tables provided in Schmithals  and Schütz (1995). 
 
Figure 2 
Growth Rate Annuities by Company and Average,
Escalating Participation Scheme
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Note: Growth Rates by company as provided in LV-Win by Morgen & Morgen GmbH. 
 
Figure 2 
Interest Rate and Average Participation Rate 2003
(=Growth Rate Annuities + 3.25%)
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Note: Average profit sharing rates calculated from growth rates as provided in LV-Win by Morgen & Morgen 
GmbH. Interest rates are taken from ECB monthly bulletin, March 2003 and http://www.bondboard.de/. 
